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Stein‘s phenomenological value theory stands among various contributions to a 
phenomenology of value and valuation.1 It stands in many ways between Scheler‘s 
theory, stressing the a priori of the values and of the hierarchy they form2 and 
Husserl‘s, which is interested in describing the act of valuation and sees values as 
founded on things.3 It also stands between Sartre‘s later subjectivist existentialism 
and Levinas‘ insistence on the Other as the ground of obligation.4 Stein, because of 
her ability to synthesise the best from Scheler and Husserl, and because she started 
with the notion of empathy, which allowed her to include the hermeneutical 
tradition from Dilthey, elaborates a phenomenological theory of motivation in 
 
1 So also John Drummond in his Introduction to Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy. A 
Handbook, Kluwer, 2002, p. 8. Stein‘s value theory is to be found in her early work; in On the Problem 
of Empathy (henceforth PE), Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (henceforth  PPH), and in An 
Investigation Concerning the State, all from the Collected Works of Edith Stein (CWES) ICS Publications, 
Washington DC as volumes 3, 7 and 10 respectively. The German originals have been critically 
edited in the Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe (ESGA) from Herder, Würzburg, vol. 5, 6 and 7 respectively. 
There is little doubt that Stein learned much from Adolph Reinach, whose phenomenological 
stringency and attention to matters of practical philosophy, made him develop a theory of values, 
which serves as template for Stein‘s. See for example Adolph Reinach: ‗Die Überlegung: ihre etische 
und rechtliche Bedeutung‘, Gesammelte Schriften, pp. 121-16 and Sämtliche Werke pp. 279-311. See also 
Beate Beckmann: Phänomenologie des religiösen Erlebnis. Religionsphilosophische Überlegungen im Anschluss an 
Adolph Reinach und Edith Stein, Königshausen und Neumann, 2003, pp. 90-92; 196-208. This paper 
was originally given as a lecture at Wheaton College, Illinois, repeated at the Baltimore Carmel, 
November 2009. 
2 Max Scheler: Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, transl. by Frings and  Funk, 
Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973; Ressentiment, translated by William W. Holdheim. 
Schocken, New York, 1972. 
3 See Ideas II, tr. by Rojcevicz and Schuwer, Kluwer, 1989, Section III and Vorlesungen über Ethik und 
Wertlehre, Husserliana Bd. XXVIII. 
4 John Drummond op. cit. gives up situating Stein as either a realist axiologist (understanding values 
to exist independently of the evaluator) or an idealist subjectivist (which existentialists or value 
constructivists could be said to be) and for good reason. She, like the early and middle Husserl, 
understands the constitution of values to rely on the subject as much as on the object constituted 
(which as constituted, and intersubjectively constituted, must have essence). This intentional 
structure of all experience is the key to the inseparability of subjective perspective and objective 
analysability in early transcendental phenomenology: Stein would understand the label 
‗transcendental‘ to refer to exactly this necessity, which could be likened to a Möbius band whose 
inner and outer side is so connected that it is neither and both. See her discussion of realism and 
idealism in Einführung in die Philosophie, ESGA 8, pp. 69-72 (‚Die metaphysische Bedeutung des 
Wahrnehmungsproblems: die Idealismusfrage‘), and Hans Rainer Sepp‘s discussion of it: ‚Edith 
Steins Position in die idealismus-realismus Debatte‘ in Beckmann and Gerl-Falkovitz (eds.): Edith 
Stein. Themen Bezüge Dokumente, Königshausen und Neumann, 2003. 
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which value plays the role of motivation‘s object or formal explanation (analogous 
to how the perceived is the specific object of perception and its formal 
explanation). Motivation is like perception in that it is experienced as identified by 
its object. It is unlike perception in that it is felt specifically and in that it can be 
followed or infelt (empathised) in others, in texts, and in other things marked by 
spirit.5 Motivatedness reveals to us the entire inner world of persons and is in fact, 
according to Stein, what we understand by spirit.6 
It is the simplicity of this understanding — spirit is motivatedness — that 
allows Stein to develop her comprehensive theory of what in German is called the 
‗sciences of the spirit‘, and which we in English call ‗the humanities‘ 
(Geisteswissenschaften). As values are what allow us to conceptualise what type of 
motivatedness we have in front of us, they also explain why something is done. 
When this is their function, we call them motives. Motives, like values, can be 
shared, in the same way as what is perceived can be seen by others. But unlike 
perception, shared motivation involves an inner dimension that allows for 
motivation to be shared at different levels in accordance with the structure of the 
persons motivated, so that intersubjective constitution is layered in contrast with the 
simple constitution of the I. Motivation is power or life, like the spirit is, and 
focussing on the values in which this power is conceptualised as originating or as 
objective, must be accompanied by a focus on valuation, which is the act in which I 
allow this power to flow into my life stream and direct it or not, the act in which I 
constitute the values as mine. 
Let us first look at how values are experienced according to Stein (1). Then 
we will have to ask what that tells us about what they are, and what reasons we have 
to affirm that they are what we think they are (2). And finally we will have to ask 
what that allows us to know about ourselves (3). 
 
 
I 
THE EXPERIENCE OF VALUES 
 
Experience, to Stein, is what is left when the phenomenological and transcendental 
reductions have been performed. She assumes Husserl‘s consent in this, although 
one might well think that the performance of the reductions for him leaves us with 
the transcendental ego. Stein takes this to be correct in so far as the transcendental 
ego includes experience as it is experienced. If it does not, there is nothing to 
investigate and the whole enterprise of phenomenology falls down for lack of 
material with which to engage. As this is absurd, Stein regards experience to be a 
more accurate description of what is left by the reductions, as indeed I experience 
not only one I, but several, and could not even conceptualise the I as an I (or even 
as an ego) were it not for the others, nor conceptualise the world were it not for 
 
5 Perception as well can be empathised, but not really without empathising its motivation. What we 
see when seeing someone watch, is that they watch something, aeroplanes, for example. We might 
wonder why they do that, but then we are already preoccupied with motivations, just as we are, when 
we wonder what they are watching. Motivations, generally speaking, interests us far more than the 
sheer perception of things, as this perception only makes sense in relation to its motivation. 
6 A full-scale comparison of the three authors on the subject of values is beyond the scope of this 
paper. To the author‘s knowledge it does not yet exist, but would make a wonderful topic for a 
doctoral dissertation, and fill a gap in current scholarship. 
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their perspectives on it that allow me to distinguish it in intersubjectively constituted 
entities. Experience, for Stein, is thus rock bottom, it is shared, and therefore 
available for everyone to test, understand, contest and explore. This is how 
phenomenology can be a collaborative enterprise, as envisaged, but perhaps not 
practised, by Husserl, who seems to have expected conformity to his thoughts 
rather than collaboration of his closest and dearest.7 
 Experience, as we experience it in common, is experienced as motivated, 
otherwise communication about it would not be possible.8 This is so commonplace 
that we hardly think about the possibility of isolating motivation from experience. 
Stein defines it thus: 
 
Motivation, in our general sense, is the connection that acts get into with one another: [...] 
an emerging of the one out of the other, a self-fulfilling or being fulfilled of the one on the 
basis of the other for the sake of the other (p. 41). 
 
Stein thus explicitly denies motivation being an act, and in this sense it is unlike 
perception. It is more on a par with constitution, although motivation must 
presuppose constitution, as there could be no emerging of one act experienced out 
of another were it not for entities or acts experienced.9 On the other hand Stein 
cannot envisage constitution to be completely inexplicable, and when we explain it, 
we invariably see it as motivated precisely by its object, and thus the hermeneutical 
circle is introduced into the heart of intentionality: we interpret reality or objectivity, 
and our motivation in doing so is reflected in what we see. We see as we are 
motivated to see, and this we see first and foremost in others, where it comes to us 
as the reason for their perspective being different from ours. Having seen it in 
others, we also see, however, that they see it in us by what Stein calls ‗reiterated 
empathy‘,10 and we then conclude that this is how it is: I see the world in a manner 
that can be explained by (my) motivation.11  
Turning towards the source of motivation to look at it is a road fraught with 
difficulties. Partly because it requires the trained ability to empathise, as it is only by 
means of empathy that values can be seen as objective, i.e. as something that also 
exists for others as motivators.12 If empathy is not sufficiently trained, it is with 
difficulty that I distinguish motivation from myself: I see its source as if it were 
identical to myself. Then, of course, I cannot explain how it comes about that 
others are motivated, nor understand what they are motivated by, so it remains that 
the inability to empathise is a deficiency in my ability to explain, which, however, 
may well be experienced by the one suffering from it as a means of being powerful, 
 
7 See for example Marianne Sawicki; Body Text and Science. The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the 
Phenomenology of Edith Stein, Kluwer, 1997, Chapter 4. 
8 ‗Germany surrendered because the Allies forced them to.‘ This statement relies on us knowing 
what ‗because‘ means; it expresses that the action of ‗Germany‘ was motivated by ‗the force of the 
Allies‘. We explain the actions of others as well as of ourselves to others by such ‗because‘, which in 
fact signifies the motivation. 
9 Marianne Sawicki discusses the relative importance of empathy, constitution and motivation as 
regards the phenomenological project. op. cit. Chapter 2 and 3. See also my On the Problem of Human 
Dignity. A Hermeneutical and Phenomenological Investigation, Königshausen und Neumann, 2009, Chapter 
9.  
10 PE, Chapter 2, 3 (f). 
11 PE, Chapter 3, 5 (g). 
12 PE, Chapter 3, 5 (m-p) 
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of originating the world, of being in charge, and therefore not so easily given up.13 
Thus, inability or unwillingness to empathise is the first systemic or endemic 
obstacle to bringing oneself to face the source of motivation. The next is that one 
might not want to see what one then sees. One might not like to see one‘s gesture 
as issuing from jealousy, as this says something about oneself, in which one might 
not want to recognise oneself. My potential dislike of my jealous self (which again is 
experienced motivation) shows us something more about values: we experience 
them as actually informing who we are, as if our acceptance of the motivation 
issuing from them makes up our substance and forges our very being as individual 
persons. Stein will see them as explaining our personality: our value response as 
mediated by the psyche‘s retention of traces of earlier value responses facilitating 
others of the same type.14 So turning our attention towards the source of motivation 
presupposes two things: it presupposes our ability and willingness to empathise, 
which allows us to see values as objective and not as merely originated in, ourselves, 
and it presupposes our ability and willingness to see ourselves in the light of these 
values as objective, i.e. as seen by others, any other, and, most excruciatingly, by 
myself.  
What do we see then when we turn to face the values? Light? Life? Energy? 
The difficulty of seeing what we see quite likely is that we see precisely nothing in a 
literal sense. We see something by insight: we gather information from a myriad of 
sources to form an intuition of what we see. And then we see ‗in images‘, ‗light‘, 
‗life‘, ‗energy‘. The most important sources from which we gather this information 
are feelings, and paired with them our understanding of the state of our psyche that 
allows us to interpret the information about motivation that the feelings carry.15 
 Let us start at the end, with the psyche, proceeding later to feelings and the 
meaning they carry. The psyche, for Stein, is constituted from all experiences in 
which life power is experienced as an element.16 I do not experience the stream of 
experience flowing always in the same manner. Excitement is accompanied by a 
characteristic artificial quickening of experience, and tiredness by the stream ‗drying 
up‘, so that pain results when one attempts to bring the experiences into a coherent 
order or understand. Vitality shows up as openness to experiences and a certain 
ease in bringing them into order. These phenomena are distinct from the experience 
of motivation because they appear as its limit. Although motivation can feed life 
power to an extraordinary extent, it cannot produce it. When ‗the batteries are flat‘ 
as indeed we say, what normally enlivens us becomes a pain, and indeed we may not 
be able to experience it at all (the mathematical proof, the elegant argument). All we 
want when entirely exhausted is to sleep and switch off the stream of experience, at 
least to the extent where we have to intervene in it by being conscious. The 
phenomena of life power hence seems to testify to something that is not 
 
13 It might, as in this imagined case, be seen from the outside, however. 
14 PE, Chapter 4. 
15 PE, Chapter 3. 
16 Ibid. and PPH, Treatise 1: Psychic Causality. Stein seems to be the only one among the 
phenomenologists to have elaborated a distinction between psyche and spirit. As a consequence 
understanding of the emotions allows her to see them as analysable as psychic phenomena with a 
physical as well as a spiritual side. See Christof Betchart: ‗Was ist Lebenskraft? Edith Steins 
erkenntnistheoretischen Prämissen in „Psychische Kausalität― (Teil 1)‘ in Edith Stein Jahrbuch 2009, 
pp. 154-84; and ‚Was ist Lebenskraft? Edith Steins anthropologischer Beitrag in „Psychische 
Kausalität― (Teil 2)‘ in Edith Stein Jahrbuch 2010, pp. 33-64. 
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motivation, to the type of causality which Stein calls ‗psychic causality‘, which 
cannot be infelt or understood but can nevertheless be observed as part of 
‗nature‘.17  
 The experience of life power allows us to constitute the psyche as a 
characteristic of ‗me‘, as something that colours ‗my‘ experiences, and which I 
experience as colouring the experiences of others as well. The psyche however, does 
not form part of the spiritual world of values that I experience as motivating my 
own person and that of others; it is experienced as transcendent, as pertaining to me 
because I am also embedded in a causal network which is different from that of the 
spirit. The law of this network of nature is causality, just like the law of the network 
that is spirit is motivation.18 
 Having seen what the psyche is, we can start looking at the feelings. They 
are experienced as pertaining to both networks, that of nature and that of the spirit: 
they cause something in me (the blood to rush, the hands to sweat, the knees to 
weaken) and they are motivated by something that comes to me as a message 
sounding something like ‗this is valuable‘, ‗dangerous‘, ‗horrid‘, ‗beautiful‘.19 The 
message carried is the motivating power of what is intended. What I feel is where it 
can carry me; who I shall be if I let it into the substance of my soul, what can 
happen as a result of this power not only to me but to others as well. My psyche 
lights up at the message, depending on how it is prepared to receive it, and the 
spiritual energy reverberates through it like sound through a musical instrument. 
The psyche is the sounding board, which transforms spiritual energy into causal 
phenomena and make me feel physically what otherwise is invisible and does not 
belong to the world of nature at all. The psyche is the antenna that captures the 
signal, the network that stores the message; the feeling is the act in which I detect 
this (slight, perhaps, but nevertheless significant) physical reaction, this fluctuation 
in life power, caused by the spiritual energy passing through. Just as it is possible for 
me to disengage from my field of vision (if I am concentrating on what someone is 
 
17 PPH, Treatise 1, I: Causality in the Realm of Pure Experiences. ‗If I feel myself to be weary, then 
the current of life seems to stagnate, as it were. It creeps along sluggishly, and everything that‘s 
occurring in the different sensory fields is involved in it. The colours are sort of colourless, the tones 
are hollow, and every ―impression‖ – each datum that is registered with the life stream against its 
will, so to speak – is painful, unpleasant. Every colour, every tone, every touch ―hurts‖. If the 
weariness subsides, then a shift enters the other spheres as well. And the moment when the 
weariness changes into vigour, the current starts to pump briskly, it surges forward unrestrainedly. 
Everything that is emerging in it carries the whiff of vigour and joyfulness.‘ (pp. 14-15) 
18 PPH, 1, V: ‗The Intermeshing of Causality and Motivation‘. Husserl‘s Ideas II is based on the same 
idea, and it is worth remarking, that Stein wrote PPH immediately after having taken her leave as 
Husserl‘s assistant, during which period, she among other things edited Ideas II and III. 
19 PE, 4, 1: ‗All outer perception is carried out in spiritual acts. Similarly, in every literal act of 
empathy, i.e. in every comprehension of an act of feeling, we have already penetrated into the realm 
of the spirit. For, as physical nature is constituted in perceptual acts, so a new object realm is 
constituted in feeling. This is the world of values. In joy the subject has something joyous facing 
him, in fright something frightening, in fear something threatening. Even moods have their objective 
correlate. For him who is cheerful, the world is bathed in a rosy glow; for him who is depressed, 
bathed in black. And all this is co-given with acts of feeling as belonging to them. It is primarily 
appearances of expression that grant us access to these experiences. As we consider expressions to 
be proceeding from experiences, we have the spirit here simultaneously reaching into the physical 
world, the spirit ―becoming visible‖ in the living body. This is made possible by the psychic reality of 
acts as experiences of a psycho-physical individual, and it involves an effect on spiritual nature.‘ (p. 
92). 
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saying, for example, or am listening to music), I can disengage from the field of 
emotions, thus paying no attention to the information carried in them, if I want to 
concentrate on another source of information, say what can be seen or heard or 
known about an object apart from its value. Some people think that objective 
science is made this way, and only in this way, that science per definition is value 
free. For Stein, such an idea simply begs the question, as the whole question of the 
motivation for such science is left unexplored. It would by its own inner necessity 
lead to a discussion of the driving interest, of social paradigms setting an agenda 
underpinning the scientists, and ultimately to a discussion of the entire social setting 
that makes the science meaningful as activity for the scientists, investors and society 
at large. Science is ‗objective‘, that is appropriately addressing its object, only when 
it takes all factors relating to this object into account, and that includes its value, as 
any object is only ever completely constituted when it is constituted also in its 
value.20 
 Feelings are, therefore, far from irrelevant in science, in particular in the 
humanities, where the information they carry is at the centre of the investigation. 
So, what are they? 
 As already said they are a kind of physical measure of the effect of spiritual 
energy on the psyche.21 As the mercury that rises in the thermometer indicates heat 
in the surroundings because mercury expands, thus anger is felt in the blood 
rushing to the back of the brow and the tension of the body preparing for 
aggression. Love is felt in the inclination of the heart, the loosening of the limbs, 
the easy acceptance of the presence of the other in close proximity. With them they 
carry the message: this makes me angry, I love that man: the object they present to 
us has the formal quality (as Aquinas would say) of being ‗uneasily avoidable evil‘, 
or ‗good‘, and hence reveal to us a valuation we have always already performed 
when we feel. The first things with which attention to feelings thus confronts us is 
this implicit valuation, over which in fact I experience myself as having much more 
control than over the feelings, which are sheer reactions, affects, effects of spiritual 
energy on the psyche. The valuation is the allowance I make for the effect to take 
place: I do think this attitude, act, situation is bad, and I therefore allow myself to 
be angry; I do think this man is lovely, therefore I allow myself to love him. If I 
don‘t think that this attitude actually is all that bad, that this situation in fact merits 
scorn, then I revise my attitude. I then don‘t allow the anger to flow freely, it is cut 
at its source, so to speak: there is nothing to be angry about. Likewise with the love: 
if the man turns out not to be lovely at all, the love dries up at the source. The 
situation is different if I feel the anger, and feel it is justified, but know that it is 
socially inexpedient or perhaps even dangerous to express it, and take this as my 
motive for not expressing the anger. Then the anger is still simmering, still 
motivating me (and probably still detectable in my comportment to others who 
 
20 Hence PPH is indeed a contribution towards the founding of the sciences of psychology and the 
humanities, both of which, without the distinction between nature, psyche and spirit would continue 
to be imprecise about what exactly they study and therefore be unable to progress in an orderly 
fashion as sciences. 
21 This is why psychology can also conduct investigations of emotions in their physical properties. 
Entirely disregarding their cognitive side, however, would reduce psychology to a natural science, 
and consequently fail to do justice to the proper object of psychology, the psyche, which is neither 
nature nor spirit, but the interface between the two. 
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know me well), just like the love still is, when it cannot find an   acceptable 
expression.22 
 Thus the feelings make me realise the motivation as it reaches the level of 
detectability in the psyche. I retain the possibility of taking an attitude in relation to 
them, i.e. stand over them and let the motivation they carry determine my actions or 
in contrast, not allow their energy to determine the direction of my motivation as an 
acting person.23 Practical wisdom consists in being able to judge the true good of 
the whole person, the community and the other, and in knowing how to ‗sail up 
against the wind‘, or harness the powers expressed in the feelings in a manner that 
allows for a complete expression that does not damage what is deepest in our 
souls.24 
 
 
II  
WHAT ARE THE VALUES AND WHAT REASONS DO WE HAVE TO  
AFFIRM THAT THEY ARE WHAT WE THINK THEY ARE? 
 
 
Having looked at the feelings as the fundamental source of information about the 
values for beings, who like human beings are endowed with a psyche, we must 
proceed to look at the second source of information which is insight or reason. The 
experience of not wanting the feeling felt to determine one‘s actions implies in fact 
that we have another way of experiencing motivation, which is less dependent on 
feeling, but which nevertheless finds expression in one‘s experience. If I deny 
myself the ‗right‘ to be angry facing an object I cannot really want to condemn or 
regard as bad, it is because I ‗see‘ that it is not so bad after all, that compared to 
other activities, say, it comes out rather well, that its effects have proven acceptable, 
that others have benefited from it, etc. By reasoning I compute the effects resulting 
from the motivation to evaluate it ‗objectively‘, i.e. according to what it is in itself, 
 
22 See my ‗Study-guide to Edith Stein‘s Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities‘ in the Yearbook of the 
Irish Philosophical Society 2004, also available online. 
23 PPH, Treatise 1, III, § 3-4: ‗I can ―take a stance‖ towards the attitude, in a new sense. I can accept 
it, plant my feet on it, and declare my allegiance to it. Suppose I accept it – that means that if it 
emerges in me I give myself over to it, joyously, without reluctance. Suppose I deny it – that doesn‘t 
mean I eliminate it. That‘s not under my control. ―Cancelling out‖ a belief would require new 
motives, through which the motives of the original belief are invalidated and from which the 
cancellation is established instead ―all by itself‖. But I need not acknowledge this belief. I can 
comport myself just as though it were not present; I can make it inoperative. (It is this, the 
comporting, that Husserl designated as epochē. The acts rendered inoperative are ―neutralized‖).‘ (p. 
49) 
24 It cannot be said that Stein developed an ethics or a moral philosophy, although there is the basis 
for doing so in her writings on anthropology on the one hand and her value theory on the other. The 
difficulties of thinking together these elements are broached by John Drummond in his 
‗Aristotelianism and Phenomenology‘ published in the work edited by him cited above, pp. 15-45. 
Judith Parsons thesis: Edith Stein: Toward an Ethic of Relationship and Responsibility, Duquesne University 
2005 could be a starting point for such an investigation, as indeed the many investigations of Stein‘s 
philosophical, educational anthropology. It could be argued that education theory, because education 
is a moral act par excellence, implicitly contain an ethics or moral philosophy. See also: Bernhard 
Augustin: ‗Ethische Elemente in der Anthropologie Edith Steins‘ in Beckmann-Zöller and Gerl-
Falkovitz (eds.): Die unbekannte Edith Stein: Phänomenologie und Sozialphilosophie, Peter Lang, 2006, pp. 
193-200. The article is based on a doctoral dissertation of the same name. 
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according to the motivating power it actually possesses as such. When all is counted 
I judge that it is after all not worth being angry about: it is good for what it is, say. 
This ability to compute motivation from various sources and refer it back to its own 
source, the value, to evaluate the value as such, is a capacity animals do not seem to 
have. They do not seem to be able to bring into focus a value as such, and hence 
they cannot reason, as this is precisely what we do when reasoning. When I add 2 + 
2 I focus the value of 2, i.e. its motivating power, and I add it to 2 to get the 
motivating power of 4. Logic, as Husserl also thought, has the same fundamental 
structure as axiology; to Stein this is the case because both rely on the ability to 
evaluate motivating power.  
 This computing does not happen at the same pace in everyone.25 Just as 
some have specific talents for mathematics, others have specific ‗emotional 
intelligence‘, depth of interpretation, or wisdom, and hence we teach each other and 
learn from each other. Education is a systematic effort to bring values to the 
attention of the child growing up and to the adult in quest of deeper knowledge. 
‗Moral education‘ is of course specifically addressed at forming the character of the 
individual, and is therefore of particularly existential importance for the individual 
(and also of interest to society at large). The sciences of the humanities 
systematically explore motivational relationships and thus help us develop our 
ability to interpret the world, ourselves, and our social relationships. That, as 
governments should regularly be told, is of no small benefit to society: it is the basis 
for our collaboration and life together. 
 As a beginner (which we always remain in relation to values since they 
originate our power), where do I start to find out about what values to place higher 
than others? How do I start to learn to think about how to lead (in a very literal 
sense) my life? 
 This question is always already raised by the fact that I can take an attitude 
in relation to my feelings and sometimes feel I must do that. Why do I feel I must? I 
feel that the value motivating my attitude is higher than the one revealing itself in 
my emotions, and thus I form a value hierarchy: I place one as more important than 
another, or to put it in another way: I recognise in one value a higher motivating 
power than in another, and thus attempt to stem the motivation felt as expressing 
itself in my feeling by ‗standing on it‘ with my attitude, taking command of myself. 
It is in this process that I look to others to see what they do in similar situations and 
attempt to learn from their experiences about the ‗real‘ motivating power of the 
values, i.e. what happens when one opens one‘s life to them and let them determine 
its direction. 
 In this process, however, insight into the motivating power is not the only 
factor at work. This is because I can access this power in two other ways, apart 
from direct motivation. 1. I can access this power by means of the psyche being 
‗contaminated‘ with it as it is transferred from one psychic network to another and 
in fact can make of those networks one operational unity. This happens when 
individuals form a mass, as at a football match, a rock concert or a mass political 
 
25 I know this by the means of empathy as explained above, and in general my ability to empathise 
gives much more scope to my experience of values, partly because it allows me to access values I did 
not know about otherwise and partly because it allows me to constitute the values as objective, i.e. as 
there for others as well. 
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meeting.26 Dancers, lovers, sportsmen and physical workers learn to exploit this 
psychic unification, and perhaps mothers with their children. We can also form 
psychical unities with animals, as the rider does with his horse, or the dog or falcon 
do with the hunter. 2. I can also access motivational power by deciding to belong to 
a group founded on allegiance to certain values and being accepted into the group 
because of certain objective criteria. This happens when I am admitted to an 
association, granted access into the United States, purchasing a health insurance 
policy, or when I join the Society for Phenomenology in the Human Sciences.27 In 
the first case of sentient contagion I am powered by values that may remain entirely 
foreign to me, which I might not know about at all, but at the price of not being 
conscious about what I want and do.28 In the second case of society forming my 
decision links me to the association, but I need not myself be motivated by the 
values the association stands for. I can very well be a member of the communist 
party and not at all be motivated in my personal life by communist values, except 
that the organisation usually retains the ‗right‘ to disengage itself from me if it 
esteems that my actions do not sufficiently express the values it stands for. The 
association retains a power over me, thus, over the expression of motivatedness in 
my life, in so far as I want to be a member and am a member precisely because I 
want to be. This power is parallel to (but very different from) that of the crowd, 
which, when I am immersed in it and part of it precisely because I am immersed, 
retains a power over my behaviour by switching off my own motivatedness and 
with it my own access to the depths of my soul. As we grow up these relationships 
are not transparent to us, and we do not always know where our motivation stems 
from, whether it is the expectations of my family, tribe or peers that determine me, 
or the form of the state in which I am raised. As teenagers we rebel against all social 
constraints to find out who we really are, i.e. what we really want to be motivated 
by, ourselves. That process in many ways lasts for the rest of one‘s life, and thus 
there does not seem to be a closed or definitive account of what the deepest or the 
highest values are, although there does seem to be something we strive towards, a 
higher clarity. Of course, many accounts exist of what the highest values are, and we 
learn about them as we grow up – we might also commit ourselves to some of 
them. Such commitment, however, like the belonging to an association, cannot 
according to Stein be the final word about our valuation, as commitment, however 
heroic, relies on acts of will and not on the motivation itself. Only the motivation 
itself allows for community proper and hence for understanding the world without 
preconceived opinions about how it should be.29 
 As we experiment in social construction, i.e. as we attempt to find out what 
the world is to us, we come to identify three corresponding ways of being ‗us‘: as 
mass, as association and as community. I can be part of ‗us‘, because I am 
contaminated with the opinions and views that ‗we‘ have: I am then referring to my 
peer group by means of remaining  as they are and that usually means accepting 
 
26 PPH, 2. Treatise, II, §4 (b) 
27 PPH, 2. Treatise, II, §4 (c) 
28 Scheler mentions emotional infection (The Nature of Sympathy, Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1954 
(repr. 1970 and 1979, pp. 14-7), and no doubt Stein is inspired by him in her account. Because he 
does not systematically distinguish psyche and spirit he does not see the networks these form as the 
reasons for our ability to sociate in these ways, however. 
29 Both association and mass predetermine our point of view, by expecting of us that we view the 
world as the majority does (as our group does) or as we agree to do.  
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social pressure without realising it; just thinking, doing and feeling whatever I am 
expected to.30 I can also be part of ‗us‘ because I have decided to, and because my 
decision has been accepted: in that case I feel obliged to think, do and feel as I am 
expected to, because I have in a certain sense decided to or promised to do so by 
entering the organisation and having obtained acceptance. And finally I can be part 
of us because of my own personal value response, which allows me to form one 
motivational movement with others motivated in the same way, not by emotional 
manipulation, coercion or agreement, but because it is thus. This latter form is the 
heart of all ‗we‘s, meaning that a ‗we‘ cannot persist without some element of this 
type of commonality present in it: the crowd has no shape and no limit, whereas the 
association has no life. Only the community has both structure and life.31 
 Having and sharing a worldview is also reliant on which subject of 
intersubjective constitution I take to be the decisive one, as this determines the 
structure of intersubjective constitution for me in this regard. ‗The world‘ is 
constituted by (1) people constituting it in this way ‗because everyone else does‘, (2) 
people constituting it in this way because they think they ought to having decided or 
‗promised‘ to constitute it as the chosen group prescribes it and (3) people 
constituting it willy-nilly as they are motivated to, according to their lights and 
naively, simply. I have to take account of this structure of intersubjectivity when I 
move in the world: in fact I know well how to distinguish a socialist by conformism 
from one who is a socialist by commitment, and both from the one who just is a 
socialist, without even perhaps being a member of the party.  
 Thus we can say about the values that they are their motivating power of which 
we always have expandable experience. Our reasons for evaluating certain values as 
highest can amount to social conformism, choice and the experience of the values 
themselves. At none of these levels are we able to communicate about them, were it 
not because we expressed ourselves by means of judgements, and thus expressed 
our conviction that values are such and such. Hedwig Conrad-Martius‘ argument for 
the indispensability of the verb ‗is‘ in the structure of judgement always convinced 
Stein that although we can methodologically reduce experience to view it as such, 
we cannot act without already having accomplished a judgement of existence, as we 
have to act on a motivation we take to be the one that determines us.32 Maurice 
Blondel, in fact, had a similar argument from action for the practical necessity of 
 
30 A neighbouring German tradition, stemming from Gerda Walther, another of Husserl‘s and 
perhaps Stein‘s students, investigates ‗Kollektive Intentionalität‘ (Collective Intentionality), to 
understand the ‗we‘. See for example the volume by the same name, edited by Hans Bernhard 
Schmid and David P. Schweikard, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2009 
31 The articles in the volume mentioned above suffer, when at all accepting the idea of a structure of 
intersubjectivity, from not sufficiently distinguishing motivation from the life of the psyche (Phillip 
Pettit, for ex., already in the introduction to his contribution slides from spiritual to mental to 
psychological seemingly making no distinction at all). The distinction of different types of 
commonality which relies on this distinction, is therefore not made. John Searle (p. 504 ff), to take 
another example, will take collective intentionality to rely on a biological fact (hence short-circuiting 
the phenomenological method), and identify collective intentionality as the psychological 
presupposition of social reality in its entirety (p. 511). His understanding of what he calls a ‗function‘ 
relies on an implicit understanding of valuation, which he reserves the right to leave unexplained. 
Neither of these relies on Gerda Walther‘s heritage. Schmid does, and hence the introduction to the 
volume, co-written by him, opens up the debate in an insightful manner. 
32 Hedwig-Conrad Martius: Das Sein, Kösel Verlag, München, 1957. Stein knew the argument in an 
earlier version. 
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ontology: that we have to act in the world shows us both that we are finite and that 
we cannot dispense ourselves from pretending we know what is the case.33 In Stein 
this knowledge motivates a search: if we have to pretend, we might as well try to get 
our pretension as right as we can, or at least as we want it, since it is irreducibly our 
responsibility. 
 
 
III 
WHAT DOES THIS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT VALUES ALLOW US  
TO KNOW ABOUT OURSELVES? 
 
First and foremost this knowledge about values, this phenomenological value 
theory, allows us to know that we are persons, as persons are subjects that are 
essentially value-related.34 As we, and in so far as we, are motivated we are thus 
persons. This is not all that we are, as we are not exclusively spiritual: we are also of 
the type of psycho-physical individual which is called a human being.35 This is 
manifest in the fact that we feel and that our direct access to the motivating powers, 
outside the psycho-physical person that we are, is very limited. Thus we are human 
persons, not angels, not gods, not animals, not things. We have something in 
common with all of these: the fact that we are persons with angels and God, the 
fact that we have a psyche with animals, and the fact that we also have a body that 
manifests us in the world is something we have in common with things. 
 Such value theory also allows us to know that there is something very 
decisive in our value response as it forms us interiorly, where it is experienced. I 
experience my own value as an I, as a person: I also experience the level of depth at 
which my personal value response allows me to express myself in my actions, 
corresponding to the height of the motivating power of the values accessed.36 This 
brings me up against the fact that I cannot flee from who I have become in my own 
eyes, from myself, from what I have made of myself as a psycho-physical individual 
person in the light of the values I am (in fact) motivated by. From here stems the 
power of and need for forgiveness, which as life draws to a close becomes the only 
way for us to reconcile ourselves with what we have become by our own doing. 
 Such value theory allows us furthermore to know that there is nothing that 
is not important in one way or another, nothing that has no value and cannot be 
explored to find out about the essential relationships pertaining to being a person in 
the world. Thus, for example, it pertains to the person as such to be spiritual and 
capable of community because it is essentially motivated, it pertains to the human 
person as such to be embedded in other forms of commonality because of its 
structure as a psycho-physical individual person, it pertains to values to motivate 
spiritual subjects, to spiritual subjects to be motivated, to motivation to be felt in 
psychophysical individuals. All this pertains to human experience, to experience as 
we know it: attempting to describe experience as if it were not motivated will 
remain a stunted effort, manifesting our own disavowed motivation and 
 
33 Maurice Blondel: L’Action (1893), Paris, PUF, 1973 
34 PE, Chapter 4, 2 
35 PE conducts constitutional analyses of the psychophysical individual and the spiritual person 
(Chapter 3 and 4 respectively). This analysis is continued in The Structure of the Human Person (Der 
Aufbau der menschlichen Person, ESGA 14), in the process of being translated by Antonio Calcagno.  
36 PE, Chapter 4, 3 
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unwillingness to be all that we must be to do justice to our experience and analyse it 
as we experience it. 
 Stein‘s phenomenological value theory is based on experience shared by 
means of empathy. It develops an intuition that was already present in Husserl, but 
did not unfold because of the underdevelopment of his theory of empathy and his 
consequent understanding of transcendentally reduced experience. Stein‘s 
phenomenology of motivation and the psyche allows for the phenomenological 
founding of the sciences of the humanities and of psychology as she investigates 
their proper objects. Moreover, Stein sees constitution itself as motivated and hence 
introduces hermeneutics into phenomenological analysis in a manner that allows us 
to see all experience, and all constitution as motivated and therefore interpretable, 
including the experience of nature and consequent differing world views. As such 
her phenomenology could be of significance to sociology, politics, history, 
anthropology, and literary criticism, to mention but a few fields.  
 
 
 
 
 
